Genomic and epidemiological report of the recombinant XJ lineage SARS-CoV-2 variant, detected in northern Finland, January 2022.

Recombinant sequences of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant were detected in surveillance samples collected in north-western Finland in January 2022. We detected 191 samples with an identical genome arrangement in weeks 3 to 11, indicating sustained community transmission. The recombinant lineage has a 5'-end of BA.1, a recombination breakpoint between orf1a and orf1b (nucleotide position 13,296-15,240) and a 3'-end of BA.2 including the S gene. We describe the available genomic and epidemiological data about this currently circulating recombinant XJ lineage.

Introduction and rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant and the dynamics of its sub-lineages BA.1 and BA.1.1, December 2021, Finland (preprint)

Multiple introductions of SARS-COV-2 Omicron variant BA.1. and BA.1.1. lineages to Finland were detected early December 2021, and comprised the majority over Delta variant in 3 weeks in the capital region. Our sequence analysis demonstrates emergence of a large cluster of BA.1.1 in community transmission.

Introduction and Rapid Spread of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variant and Dynamics of BA.1 and BA.1.1 Sublineages, Finland, December 2021.

Multiple introductions of SARS-COV-2 Omicron variant BA.1 and BA.1.1. lineages to Finland were detected in early December 2021. Within 3 weeks, Omicron overtook Delta as the most common variant in the capital region. Sequence analysis demonstrated the emergence and spread through community transmission of a large cluster of BA.1.1 virus.

Detection and quantification of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater influent in relation to reported COVID-19 incidence in Finland.

Wastewater-based surveillance is a cost-effective concept for monitoring COVID-19 pandemics at a population level. Here, SARS-CoV-2 RNA was monitored from a total of 693 wastewater (WW) influent samples from 28 wastewater treatment plants (WWTP, N = 21-42 samples per WWTP) in Finland from August 2020 to May 2021, covering WW of ca. 3.3 million inhabitants (∼ 60% of the Finnish population). Quantity of SARS-CoV-2 RNA fragments in 24 h-composite samples was determined by using the ultrafiltration method followed by nucleic acid extraction and CDC N2 RT-qPCR assay. SARS-CoV-2 RNA signals at each WWTP were compared over time to the numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases (14-day case incidence rate) in the sewer network area. Over the 10-month surveillance period with an extensive total number of samples, the detection rate of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in WW was 79% (including 6% uncertain results, i.e., amplified only in one out of four, two original and two ten-fold diluted replicates), while only 24% of all samples exhibited gene copy numbers above the quantification limit. The range of the SARS-CoV-2 detection rate in WW varied from 33% (including 10% uncertain results) in Pietarsaari to 100% in Espoo. Only six out of 693 WW samples were positive with SARS-COV-2 RNA when the reported COVID-19 case number from the preceding 14 days was zero. Overall, the 14-day COVID-19 incidence was 7.0, 18, and 36 cases per 100 000 persons within the sewer network area when the probability to detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater samples was 50%, 75% and 95%, respectively. The quantification of SARS-CoV-2 RNA required significantly more COVID-19 cases: the quantification rate was 50%, 75%, and 95% when the 14-day incidence was 110, 152, and 223 COVID-19 cases, respectively, per 100 000 persons. Multiple linear regression confirmed the relationship between the COVID-19 incidence and the SARS-CoV-2 RNA quantified in WW at 15 out of 28 WWTPs (overall R2 = 0.36, p < 0.001). At four of the 13 WWTPs where a significant relationship was not found, the SARS-CoV-2 RNA remained below the quantification limit during the whole study period. In the five other WWTPs, the sewer coverage was less than 80% of the total population in the area and thus the COVID-19 cases may have been inhabitants from the areas not covered. Based on the results obtained, WW-based surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 could be used as an indicator for local and national COVID-19 incidence trends. Importantly, the determination of SARS-CoV-2 RNA fragments from WW is a powerful and non-invasive public health surveillance measure, independent of possible changes in the clinical testing strategies or in the willingness of individuals to be tested for COVID-19.

Incidence Trends for SARS-CoV-2 Alpha and Beta Variants, Finland, Spring 2021.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 Alpha and Beta variants became dominant in Finland in spring 2021 but had diminished by summer. We used phylogenetic clustering to identify sources of spreading. We found that outbreaks were mostly seeded by a few introductions, highlighting the importance of surveillance and prevention policies.

Clinical validation of automated and rapid mariPOC SARS-CoV-2 antigen test.

COVID-19 diagnostics was quickly ramped up worldwide early 2020 based on the detection of viral RNA. However, based on the scientific knowledge for pre-existing coronaviruses, it was expected that the SARS-CoV-2 RNA will be detected from symptomatic and at significant rates also from asymptomatic individuals due to persistence of non-infectious RNA. To increase the efficacy of diagnostics, surveillance, screening and pandemic control, rapid methods, such as antigen tests, are needed for decentralized testing and to assess infectiousness. A novel automated mariPOC SARS-CoV-2 test was developed for the detection of conserved structural viral nucleocapsid proteins. The test utilizes sophisticated optical laser technology for two-photon excitation and individual detection of immunoassay solid-phase particles. We validated the new method against qRT-PCR. Sensitivity of the test was 100.0% (13/13) directly from nasopharyngeal swab specimens and 84.4% (38/45) from swab specimens in undefined transport mediums. Specificity of the test was 100.0% (201/201). The test's limit of detection was 2.7 TCID50/test. It showed no cross-reactions. Our study shows that the new test can detect infectious individuals already in 20 min with clinical sensitivity close to qRT-PCR. The mariPOC is a versatile platform for syndromic testing and for high capacity infection control screening of infectious individuals.

Detection of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Gargle, Spit, and Sputum Specimens.

The gold standard for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection diagnosis is reverse transcription (RT)-PCR from a nasopharyngeal swab specimen (NPS). Its collection involves close contact between patients and health care workers, requiring a significant amount of workforce and putting them at risk of infection. We evaluated self-collection of alternative specimens and compared their sensitivity and cycle threshold (CT) values to those of NPS. We visited acute coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outpatients to collect concomitant NPS and gargle specimens and had patients self-collect gargle and either sputum or spit specimens the next morning. We included 40 patients and collected 40 concomitant NPS and gargle specimens, as well as 40 gargle, 22 spit, and 16 sputum specimens the next day (2 patients could not produce sputum). All specimens were as sensitive as NPS. Gargle specimens had a sensitivity of 0.97 (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.92 to 1.00), whether collected concomitantly with NPS or the next morning. Next-morning spit and sputum specimens showed sensitivities of 1.00 (95% CI, 1.00 to 1.00) and 0.94 (95% CI, 0.87 to 1.00]), respectively. The gargle specimens had significantly higher mean CT values of 29.89 (standard deviation [SD], 4.63; P < 0.001) and 29.25 (SD, 3.99; P < 0.001) when collected concomitantly and the next morning, respectively, compared to NPS (22.07 [SD, 4.63]). CT values obtained with spit (23.51 [SD, 4.57]; P = 0.11) and sputum (25.82 [SD, 9.21]; P = 0.28) specimens were close to those of NPS. All alternative specimen collection methods were as sensitive as NPS, but spit collection appeared more promising, with a low CT value and ease of collection. Our findings warrant further investigation. IMPORTANCE Control of the COVID-19 pandemic relies heavily on a test-trace-isolate strategy. The most commonly used specimen for diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection is a nasopharyngeal swab. However, this method is quite uncomfortable for the patient, requires specific equipment (nose swabs and containers), and requires close proximity to health care workers, putting them at risk of infection. Developing alternative sampling strategies could decrease the burden for health care workers, help overcome potential shortages of equipment, and improve acceptability of testing by reducing patient discomfort.

An outbreak caused by the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant (B.1.617.2) in a secondary care hospital in Finland, May 2021.

An outbreak caused by the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant (B.1.617.2) spread from one inpatient in a secondary care hospital to three primary care facilities, resulting in 58 infections including 18 deaths in patients and 45 infections in healthcare workers (HCW). Only one of the deceased cases was fully vaccinated. Transmission occurred despite the use of personal protective equipment by the HCW, as advised in national guidelines, and a high two-dose COVID-19 vaccination coverage among permanent staff members in the COVID-19 cohort ward.

Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern B.1.1.7, B.1.351 or P.1: data from seven EU/EEA countries, weeks 38/2020 to 10/2021.

We compared 19,207 cases of SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7/S gene target failure (SGTF), 436 B.1.351 and 352 P.1 to non-variant cases reported by seven European countries. COVID-19 cases with these variants had significantly higher adjusted odds ratios for hospitalisation (B.1.1.7/SGTF: 1.7, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.0-2.9; B.1.351: 3.6, 95% CI: 2.1-6.2; P.1: 2.6, 95% CI: 1.4-4.8) and B.1.1.7/SGTF and P.1 cases also for intensive care admission (B.1.1.7/SGTF: 2.3, 95% CI: 1.4-3.5; P.1: 2.2, 95% CI: 1.7-2.8).

The detection and stability of the SARS-CoV-2 RNA biomarkers in wastewater influent in Helsinki, Finland.

Wastewater-based surveillance of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is used to monitor the population-level prevalence of the COVID-19 disease. In many cases, due to lockdowns or analytical delays, the analysis of wastewater samples might only be possible after prolonged storage. In this study, the effect of storage conditions on the RNA copy numbers of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in wastewater influent was studied and compared to the persistence of norovirus over time at 4 °C, -20 °C, and -75 °C using the reverse-transcription quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) assays E-Sarbeco, N2, and norovirus GII. For the first time in Finland, the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA was tested in 24 h composite influent wastewater samples collected from Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant, Helsinki, Finland. The detected and quantified SARS-CoV-2 RNA copy numbers of the wastewater sample aliquots taken during 19-20 April 2020 and stored for 29, 64, and 84 days remained surprisingly stable. In the stored samples, the SARS betacoronavirus and SARS-CoV-2 copy numbers, but not the norovirus GII copy numbers, seemed slightly higher when analyzed from the pre-centrifuged pellet-that is, the particulate matter of the influent-as compared with the supernatant (i.e., water fraction) used for ultrafiltration, although the difference was not statistically significant. Furthermore, when wastewater was spiked with SARS-CoV-2, linear decay at 4 °C was observed on the first 28 days, while no decay was visible within 58 days at -20 °C or -75 °C. In conclusion, freezing temperatures should be used for storage when immediate SARS-CoV-2 RNA analysis from the wastewater influent is not possible. Analysis of the particulate matter of the sample, in addition to the water fraction, can improve the detection frequency.

Serological and molecular findings during SARS-CoV-2 infection: the first case study in Finland, January to February 2020.

The first case of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in Finland was confirmed on 29 January 2020. No secondary cases were detected. We describe the clinical picture and laboratory findings 3-23 days since the first symptoms. The SARS-CoV-2/Finland/1/2020 virus strain was isolated, the genome showing a single nucleotide substitution to the reference strain from Wuhan. Neutralising antibody response appeared within 9 days along with specific IgM and IgG response, targeting particularly nucleocapsid and spike proteins.